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Abstract The present work constitutes an attempt to make explicit those pragmatic
norms successfully operating in empirical science. I will first comment on the initial
presuppositions of the discussion, in particular, on those concerning the instrumental
character of scientific practice and the nature of scientific goals. Then I will depict
the moderately naturalistic frame in which, from this approach, the pragmatic norms
make sense. Third, I will focus on the specificity of the pragmatic norms, making
special emphasis on what I regard as a key idea underlying them, namely, the view,
vigorously advocated by classical pragmatists like C. S. Peirce and G. Vailati, that
the best test for objectivity is the test of action. Finally, I am going to put forward a
tentative list of pragmatic norms that can be abstracted from a careful observation and
analysis of scientific practice as provided by current philosophers of experimentation
(A. Franklin and F. Steinle among others). The norms will be divided into four classes
corresponding to four aspects of science in which they rule, that is, self-correction,
prediction, explanation and both experimentation and computation. In the following
account, the formulation of those pragmatic norms successfully governing science
will be understood as a contribution that scientifically-oriented pragmatism can make
to the normative naturalistic project in epistemology.
The resemblance between this title and that of Robert Brandom’s influential work, Making It Explicit
(1994), is not casual. There he urged philosophers to make explicit those norms governing the use of
words like ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ in actual linguistic practice, as the only way to provide an adequate
characterization of the corresponding notions. The same need of explicitness is here vindicated with
respect to norms guiding or aiming to guide scientific research, since no plausible understanding of such
research seems possible if we ignore them..
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1 Science and the normative realm
Unlike playing tennis or having popcorn, scientific practice is not an end itself. It
is rather a means to attain certain ends, and therefore it constitutes an instrumental
practice. Obviously, every instrumental practice is partly defined by virtue of the end
to which that practice is oriented and relative to which the very practice is established.
Disagreements as to what ends define a certain practice usually imply discrepancies
about how to understand such practice. As any other cognitive activity, science is
often broadly described as oriented towards the end of acquiring knowledge. Again,
depending on how we understand knowledge, we will characterize science (in the
sense of scientific practice) differently (cf. Kitcher 1992, pp. 103–104). For example,
if we thought that knowledge entails a true, well justified description of reality, then
scientific practice, as the means to attain such end, would be destined to provide con-
clusive evidence for descriptions. If, on the other hand, we understood knowledge as
equated to the ability of successfully adapting to our environment, scientific practice
would then be intended as a tool to determine which behavior would be dangerous and
which profitable given a certain environment. Furthermore, in some cases talk about
knowledge is altogether avoided as a consequence of rejecting any talk about truth,
since, according to the traditional definition, knowledge is true well justified belief.
Let us recall that Peirce, for intance, considered the fixation of belief as the ultimate
goal of cognitive activity, emphasizing at the same time the adaptative value of belief
fixation,1 and also that more recently B. C. van Fraassen argued for the primacy of
empirical adequacy over truth as a goal of scientific theorizing.
Regardless of which specific choice and definition of an end we are assuming, it
seems obvious that every practice oriented to a certain end can be performed either
successfully or unsuccessfully. In this context, the notion of success must be under-
stood in its informal, ordinary sense, as a function of utility in goal achievement. This
characterization of success presupposes an instrumentalist context of evaluation where
success is regarded as a property of practices, and the latter are, in turn, considered
as means to attain certain valuable goals. To put it in N. Rescher’s terms, success
entails “benefit-producing practices” (1977, pp. 71–72), that is, effective procedures
to obtain intended goals. Ultimately, then, evaluating success implies, not only a pre-
1 Peirce’s point of view is clearly stated in the following quote:
“With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with the cessation of doubt it ends. Hence, the
sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. We may fancy that this is not enough for us, and
that we seed, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put this fancy to the test, and it proves
groundless; for as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be
true or false. And it is clear that nothing out of the sphere of our knowledge can be our object, for
nothing which does not affect the mind can be the motive for a mental effort. The most that can
be maintained is, that we seek for a belief that we shall think to be true. But we think each one of
our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so” (Peirce 1877/2006, pp. 114–115,
italics in the original).
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vious determination of the intended goals, but also a comparative strategy to assess
the relative superiority of a practice with respect to others in terms of goal achieve-
ment effectiveness. When the success is not achieved by chance, but because of that
practice proving most effective, the properties on which that effectiveness is grounded
constitute also the basis for a corresponding norm concerning how a practice must
be in order to guarantee the attainment of a certain end, or at least to significantly
increase its likelihood.
As for the scientific norms, they will be understood as action-oriented prescrip-
tions, and therefore as drastically different from social or linguistic norms, many of
which are not prescriptive but constitutive, providing conventions on which basis a
certain practice is constituted. Grammatical norms, for example, are in the first place
conventions establishing, not how a language should be, but how it is going to be.
Similarly, social norms, like shaking hands when we are introduced to somebody, are
not ultimately prescribing how a greeting should be, but rather constituting a con-
vention about what a greeting is going to be. Scientific norms, by contrast, establish
how an already existing practice should be in order to be successful, for this reason
they are essentially prescriptive norms. It must be noted that, strictly speaking, the so-
called ‘prescriptive’ and ‘constitutive’ norms are both normative, i.e., in a way both
are trivially prescriptive, for it is clear—actually it is analytically true—that a norm
is always normative. The important point, however, is that they are so in two quite
different senses. In the case of social conventional norms, we should follow the norm,
not because it provides the best way to do something, but just because it is a shared,
agreed convention to do something in the way captured by the norm. In the case of
scientific prescriptive norms, by contrast, we should follow the norm because it pro-
vides the best, most successful way to do something. Any norm, thus, establishes how
a practice should be done, yet the normative (the “should”) element can be justified
either by virtue of a convention—as in the case of constitutive norms—or on the basis
of a means to ends successful relation—like in the case of prescriptive norms. The dis-
tinction is important not only to avoid ambiguities, especially when using terms, like
‘norm’, with an extremely broad meaning, but also to properly restrict the scope of the
present discussion to prescriptive, non-conventional scientific norms. Conventional
norms, even if also relevant to scientific methodology, are not the ones discussed here.
Now, norms pervade cognition, not only exhibiting different characters, but also
appearing in different modalities and even operating at different levels. There are,
indeed, implicit and explicit norms, actual or possible, as well as norms related, for
instance, to scientific practice and norms related to the study or philosophical approach
to that scientific practice. The interaction between these distinct aspects is highly com-
plex, since both actual and possible norms may be subject to implicitness or explic-
itness, and may be operating in science or in the philosophical inquiry into science.
Actual norms guiding scientific practice are often implicit in such practice. In that
case, part of the philosopher’s job is to identify them and make them explicit. But
this job can be supplemented by a more ambitious one, namely, conjecturing what
possible norms could be more adequate than actual norms in order to achieve a certain
pre-established end (i.e. what Kitcher calls the meliorative project in epistemology,
1992, p. 76). Granting, for now, that there are no substantial disagreements as to what
actual norms exist, there still arises the problem of the enormous variance between
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philosophical hypotheses regarding possible norms, a problem which leads us back to
that related to norms guiding philosophers in devising these hypotheses.
Summarizing some of the above issues, it is worth emphasizing that discrepancies
about norms guiding science may have two different, general sources: one related to
how cognitive ends are conceived, the other connected to what possible norms should
be acknowledged as superior once that certain ends have been commonly acknowl-
edged as the main cognitive goals. More generally, problems related to prescriptive
norms for instrumental practices may arise from disagreements concerning either the
definition of the ends or the definition of the success conditions for attaining certain
pre-established ends (or they may arise from both things). With respect to the first
possible problem, and as a minimal restriction, I am going to assume the priority of
epistemic ends, since the accomplishment of non-epistemic purposes, like survival,
adaptation and welfare, usually depends, in turn, on the attainment of epistemic ones,
for instance observation, prediction and explanation. This asymmetric dependence
relation between epistemic and non-epistemic purposes accounts for most familiar
cases where, in order to satisfy some practical interests, some previous epistemic inter-
ests must be satisfied. For instance, if we seek to adjust our behavior to the climate
conditions of a certain location, first we need to observe and predict those conditions.
These intuitive comments are, of course, not intended to settle the intricate issue of
the purpose of science, but they are rather directed to show part of the motivation to
restrict the scope of the present discussion to epistemic norms. As for the problems
concerning the definition of the means to attain certain pre-established ends, I will
consider two main philosophical trends confronting them: the apriorist and the nat-
uralistic (Laudan 1990, p. 47). According to apriorists (like Aristotle, Descartes, or
Kant), norms are established by reflection on our cognitive capacities, that is, they are
grounded on a priori theses about such capacities -like the Cartesian thesis that clear
and distinct ideas are the basis for any further knowledge acquisition, or the Kantian
idea that time and space are the pure forms of experience. Contemporary naturalists
like Laudan and Kitcher, by contrast, regard norms as empirical and therefore as based
on empirical facts about success in practice. The naturalistic approach to cognition
is characterized by its skepticism towards the adequacy of a priori justifications of
norms as well as of any other kind of theses in general.2 As discussed below, a basic,
apriorist presupposition called into question by the naturalists is the thesis that we
have transparent access to our own cognitive goals and norms. The naturalistic view
is the one endorsed here. In particular, I will adopt the naturalistic assumption that
non-casual success of scientific procedures is guaranteed (or, at least, its likelihood is
increased) by virtue of such procedure having certain properties that are empirically
determinable.
Norms are usually characterized as pragmatic if they are adopted for reasons regard-
ing usefulness. However, without denying that aspect of pragmatic norms, it is possible
to identify a deeper distinctive feature of them: the underlying idea that action or, more
accurately, interaction provides the grounds for objectivity. Sound scientific inquiry
2 Let us recall what Kitcher regards as one of the main theses from naturalistic epistemology: “Virtually
nothing is knowable a priori and, in particular, no epistemological principle is knowable a priori” (1992,
p. 76).
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requires intervention in the phenomena under study, which, in turn, entails either
strengthening or weakening our expectations depending on the results prompted by
the intervention. It is this idea what explains the emphasis placed on self-correction
and experimentally controlled prediction by scientifically-oriented pragmatists like
C. S. Peirce, G. Vailati or, more recently, by Rescher. When expectations have been
challenged by the results of interaction, belief revision is one way to proceed, although
there are other options like examining the evidence, or any of the different elements in-
volved in the interaction. Pragmatic norms, therefore, not only maximize usefulness,
they also maximize objectivity by establishing some methodological requirements
concerning praxis.
What I will try to do in the following is to make explicit those pragmatic norms suc-
cessfully governing science as a contribution that scientifically-oriented pragmatism
can make to the normative naturalistic project in epistemology.
2 The naturalistic approach to scientific norms
As suggested above, the pragmatist contribution to the study of scientific methodology,
especially that due to scientifically-oriented pragmatists, is better understood within a
naturalistic philosophical frame. There are three basic points in which epistemological
naturalism and the above kind of pragmatism agree: the anti-apriorism in epistemol-
ogy, the challenge to the Cartesian test of certainty because of its being based on the
individual consciousness, and the conception of epistemology as being in continuity
with natural science. Let us briefly consider each of these points.
Advocates of epistemological naturalism, whether normative naturalists like J. Kim,
P. Kitcher and L. Laudan or radical naturalists like W. V. O. Quine, D. M. Armstrong
or P. Churchland, agree that epistemology, that is, knowledge about knowledge is a
posteriori. Pragmatists have traditionally emphasized that inquiry is a kind of practice,
and thus also refused any a priori justification of knowledge, pointing out the justifica-
tory role of practice. Furthermore, naturalists as well as pragmatists hold the view that
we cannot get a reliable access to our own cognitive states just through reflection, thus
rejecting the Cartesian ideal that we have reliable introspective access to the normative
standards that guide our inquiries. By contrast, they recognize the trust in our cognitive
habits as a key factor to ensure that our evaluations spread through our system of beliefs
in an appropriate way. In his “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities” (1877a/2006),
C. S. Peirce developed an extensive criticism of the Cartesian test of certainty because
of its being based on the individual consciousness. There he draws the philosophi-
cal consequences that follow from several anti-Cartesian theses advocated by him,
paying special attention to the one stating that: “We have no power of Introspection,
but all knowledge of the internal world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from
our knowledge of external facts” (ibid., p. 72). In a similar vein, a current pragmatist
philosopher like C. Hookway draws a distinction relevant for the present discussion,
since it suggests the possible difficulties emerging from the task of norms recognition:
“An important distinction can be drawn between:
1. Those norms and patterns of evaluation which guide us in the conduct of
activities including those of inquiry and investigations
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2. Those norms and standards of evaluation which we believe are guiding us in
these activities” (1999, p. 215).
Following a norm and believing that we follow a norm are mutually independent
phenomena. Three different cases constitute the evidence for asserting this indepen-
dence: 1. people ignore they follow a norm, 2. people wrongly think that they follow a
norm, 3. people wrongly think they do not follow a norm. On the other hand, the thesis
that epistemology is in continuity with natural science means that, in order to study
knowledge acquisition and justification, we should apply a scientific methodology.
The above considerations suggest that norms governing knowledge acquisition and
justification must be established a posteriori, rather than by an a priori, introspective
access to them.
Now, naturalistic epistemology is an extraordinarily wide field, so it can be helpful
to distinguish between different naturalistic attitudes towards the normative, and to
identify the one that best matches the above pragmatist attitude. By partially relying on
J. Maffie’s account of epistemological naturalism (cf. 1990, pp. 284–287), three dis-
tinct alternatives will be examined. The first is Quine’s eliminative naturalism, accord-
ing to which epistemic norms should be replaced with descriptions of natural facts
about the causal-nomological relations between sensory input and theoretical output.
From the second approach, that is, Laudan’s normative naturalism, epistemic norms
are regarded as reducible to descriptions of facts about means-ends instrumentally
appropriate relationships. More particularly, epistemic norms would be hypothetical
imperatives linking means and ends on the basis of empirically determined success.
Finally, there is Kim’s and Kitcher’s criterial naturalism, from which epistemic norms
are characterized as supervening upon natural, cognitive facts. Such facts would be
reasons for adopting the corresponding norms:
“(…) if a belief is justified, that must be so because it has a certain factual, non-
epistemic properties, such as perhaps that it is “indubitable”, that it is seen to be
entailed by another belief that is independently justified, that it is appropriately
caused by perceptual experience, or whatever” (Kim 1988, p. 310, italics in the
original).
It is interesting to realize that, depending on which kind of naturalism we endorse,
we will be either openly committing the naturalistic fallacy (like in Laudan’s case),
or avoiding it, in one case by ruling out the normative dimension (like in Quine’s
approach), in the other by appealing to the notion of supervenience (as Kim or Kit-
cher do). Pragmatists like Peirce and Vailati are clearly intending something else than
describing cognitive processes, they are rather laying down substantially normative
theses. As a consequence, their view is closer to that held by Laudan and criteri-
al naturalists, and, among these two remaining approaches these pragmatists seem
closer to criterial naturalism. The reason for that is that they openly commit to certain
theses regarding our cognitive nature, not to be found in Laudan’s case, who keeps
the epistemological analysis anchored to the single principle of instrumental success.
According to Peirce and Vailati, interaction with the environment as well as the result-
ing expectations and actions set the stage in which the epistemic performance takes
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place. Any normative proposal concerning inquiry needs to rest on criteria related to
this cognitive nature.
No argument will be put forward here to defend the superiority of naturalism over
other more traditional approaches, since it may even be convenient not to give up any
of them altogether. However, if we recognize that a broad epistemological naturalism
can be helpful in accounting for knowledge or cognitive achievements, then it may be
useful to also consider some interesting contributions that pragmatism can make to the
naturalistic project in epistemology. The present paper deals with the pragmatic con-
tribution to answering the above normative questions, which represents a step towards
a more developed normative naturalism.
3 The nature of pragmatic norms: some seminal ideas from Peirce, Vailati
and Quine
Let us now pay attention to what may be the most distinct feature of pragmatic norms,
namely, the assumption that action or, rather, interaction provides the grounds for
objectivity. This assumption ramifies in various philosophical claims, among them,
the idea that manipulating entities or phenomena is the best way to develop valid beliefs
about them, or the view that valid beliefs must secure successful action. Both objective
existence (i.e., according to pragmatists, the only meaningful conception of reality)
and objective, epistemic success depend, for their determination, on the essential test
of action. The first (connection) is accounted for by the fact that properties of objects
are only detectable through cause and effect relations, which, in turn, are only soundly
determinable by manipulation. The second has to do with the concrete consequences
that a true belief should support. According to Peirce, the scientific method of inquiry
is better than the others because it is deliberately designed to arrive at the ultimate
most secure beliefs, upon which the most successful actions can be based.3
It must be pointed out that the above questions concerning the justificatory aspect
of practice derive from a more basic one related to the constitutive role that, accord-
ing to pragmatists, practice plays in experience. In this conception of experience lies
precisely one of the key differences between two empiricist traditions represented by
pragmatism and neopositivism respectively. Pragmatists reject any passive conception
of experience according to which the latter should be explained in terms of sense-data
or some macroscopic, stable objects or properties. By contrast, they developed an
active conception of experience where no element or aspect is acknowledged as given,
basic, but instead action is regarded as always entering in our experience of the envi-
ronment. Also, the more scientific the experience is the more dependent on specific
3 Peirce’s appeal to experimental practice emerges already in his formulation of the pragmatic maxim:
“(…) a conception, that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in
its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life; so that, since obviously nothing that might not
result from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if one can define accurately all
the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply,
one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in
it. For this doctrine he [Peirce] invented the name pragmatism” (Peirce 1902–1907/2006, p. 162).
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actions carefully performed. All classical pragmatists agree that experience is always
active and inferential, shaped by interactions with surroundings and by the correspond-
ing habits of expectations. As a result of this important difference between pragmatists
and neopositivists, the latter have undertaken the task of formulating norms concern-
ing how observational assertions should support theoretical ones, whereas the former
have suggested norms related to how any kind of assertion, whether highly theoreti-
cal or seemingly of a basic, observational nature, must be validated in practice.4 The
emphasis placed on the role of intervention in yielding empirical meaning is common
to both operationalism and pragmatism, whose respective accounts of meaning man-
aged to supersede the sense-data approach as well as the crude physicalist one (Evans
1939, p. 424). Despite this connection between the two accounts, however, it is quite
obvious that operationalism constitutes a reductionist approach to meaning and that
nothing of that kind is pursued by pragmatists. On the other hand, the decided, multi-
dimensional appeal to practice also explains two other typical features of pragmatism
that are noticeable in the pragmatic norms: the transverse character of its principles,
manifest in the possibility of recognizing pragmatic accomplishments even if provided
from divergent theoretical approaches, and the neutrality toward foundational issues
due to the latter going beyond what can be settled through practice.5
The first main supporters of a scientificist pragmatism, i.e. Peirce and Vailati, did
not make explicit any particular set of norms that would be reponsible for ruling scien-
tific practice. Yet, they both emphasized what they understood as some of the primary
methodological characteristics of empirical science. Peirce famously drew attention
to the importance of self-correction for a practice to be considered scientific, and, as it
has been pointed out by latter pragmatists, this very requirement implies many others,
like the reliability of experimental practices or the study and control of experimen-
tal error, just to mention a couple of examples. It is also well-known the Peircean
emphasis on convergent results coming from different views and methods of identity
as the sign of truth as well as of reality. Independence from the human mind would
be the main feature of reality, and such feature would not only be manifest in the
independent cause of sensations, but also in the fact that our opinions are constrained
and forced to converge (cf. Peirce 1877/2006, p. 122; 1878/2006, pp. 146–147).6 In
4 The present use of the term ‘validate’ rests on an extensive tradition from the literature on empirical
research methodology, where ‘validity’ does not have a logical sense, but an epistemological one. In his
classic reference work from 1989, S. Messick develops the notion of (theoretical) construct validity, more
widely referred to by other authors as hypothesis validity, like in Robert W. Lissitz’s (2009) The Concept
of Validity: Revisions, New Directions, and Applications. Within this framework, validity and reliability
are regarded as logically independent notions, even if commonly associated properties of measurements
and procedures. Reliability has to do with the consistency of the outcome, while the validity concerns the
degree of success in attaining the purported outcome (that is, in determining the variable under study).
5 The above features of pragmatism have been stressed by P. Suppes in arguing that the focus on practice
as opposed to foundations is clearly recognizable in modern physics (cf. 1998, pp. 237–238, 246–251).
6 The next two quotes provide some textual evidence on this subject:
“Our external permanency would not be external, in our sense, if it was restricted in its influence to
one individual. It must be something which affects, or might affect, every man. And, though these
affections are necessarily as various as are individual conditions, yet the method must be such that
the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the same. Such is the method of science” (1877/2006,
p. 122).
123
Synthese (2013) 190:3227–3246 3235
fact, such independence would be ultimately established through the recognition that
external things are inter-subjectively determined and therefore not just determined by
individual minds.
As for Vailati, his main focus was on the predictive conditions for cognitive signif-
icance together with that on the practical or operational requirements both to generate
and validate predictions. Predictability would be the crucial pre-condition to deter-
mine both truth and meaning (cf. Vailati and Calderoni 1909/2010, pp. 249, 255).
Experience is therefore ascribed a double role (epistemic and semantic): providing the
means to verify a theory, as well as those to determine the part of the theory that is
meaningful and can therefore be object of useful discussion. The pragmatic method
does not provide a criterion to decide whether an assertion is true or false, but just a
criterion to determine the part of an assertion’s content that is necessary (though not
sufficient) to decide whether the assertion is true or false. The better the predictions
implied by such part are in terms of precision, extension, and possibility of refuta-
tion, the more profitable that the discussion of that theory can be. Vailati distinguishes
between two basic kinds of expectations: proper (or effective) expectations that some
event will happen, and conditional expectations, which consist in predictions that
some event would happen given other previous conditions (cf. Vailati and Calderoni
1909/2010, pp. 251–253). The two kinds of expectations are related in the following
way: a conditional expectation whose condition has been satisfied is necessary for a
proper expectation. The latter, therefore, depends on the former, more precisely, on the
former’s condition being verified or waited for. There would also be different kinds of
conditional expectations depending on the sorts of conditions involved. Vailati distin-
guishes between conditions that consist in some deliberate acts of ours and those that
do not so. Only the former would be essentially involved in judgments about existence
or in attribution of properties. These judgments are based on the belief in a necessary
connection between experiences produced by a voluntary act of ours and that act, that
is, the belief that certain experiences can only be obtained by means of certain delib-
erate actions on our part. When we believe that this connection is contingent, or we
consider that those experiences are rather connected to certain conditions which are
not produced by us, then we just form the belief that there is a concatenation between
some facts or, at most, that there is a cause-effect relation between them. In short,
experiences on the basis of which we assert existence are only obtained by means of
Footnote 6 continued
The same idea is stated as follows:
“On the other hand, all the followers of science are fully persuaded that the processes of investiga-
tion, if only pushed far enough, will give one certain solution to every question to which they can
be applied. One man may investigate the velocity of light by studying the transits of Venus and the
aberration of the stars; another by the oppositions of Mars and the eclipses of Jupiter’s satellites; a
third by the method of Fizeau; a fourth by that of Foucault; a fifth by the motions of the curves of
Lissajous; a sixth, a seventh, an eighth, and a ninth, may follow the different methods of comparing
the measures of statical and dynamical electricity. They may at first obtain different results, but, as
each perfects his method and his processes, the results will move steadily together toward a destined
centre. (…) This great law is embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is
fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object
represented in this opinion is the real” (1878/2006, pp. 146–147).
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certain deliberate action on our part; otherwise we could simply be justified to believe
in a certain relation between facts.7 The key issue with respect to judgments about
existence is not just what a subject has to do right before making such judgment, but
what one knows one would have to do to make sure about attributing existence to
something. Of course, once we have a good training in determining the existence of
certain things, we can make sound inferences about existence when confronted with
similar cases. Let us note that Vailati’s account is focused on sound existence judg-
ments, rather than on existence judgments regardless of their epistemic support. From
the above discussion, Vailati reaches the following normative conclusion: assertions
about existence must be translatable into certain kinds of expressions that refer to a
certain kind of conditional expectations. This claim, again, should not be interpreted
in any reductionist sense, for that kind of translation is not regarded as providing the
whole meaning of an assertion but only its the empirical content—this represents, in
fact, one of Vailati’s refinements of the Peircean semantic view.
Despite the rich material that Peirce and Vailati supplied for the project of identify-
ing the basic pragmatic norms guiding the scientific activity, the only author who made
an explicit and systematic reference to pragmatic norms was Quine,8—who, in spite
of his recurrent vindication of pragmatism in many of his works, neither appealed to
any pragmatist author, nor to any typical pragmatist thesis, in his contribution to the
present subject. His worries about confirmation holism and the underdetermination
of theories by evidence—previously discussed by him in “Epistemology Naturalized”
(1969), provided the background behind his formulation of the pragmatic norms. Such
worries, in turn, connected to some initial semantic problems concerning the inscru-
tability of reference and the indeterminacy of translation—which were extensively
addressed in his Word and Object from 1960. According to him, belief revision should
be guided by pragmatic norms, whose scope would also cover all theory formulation
and hypotheses generation, since these would amount to instances of belief revision.
The pragmatic norms would thus be heuristics that assist the scientist in belief revision
and hypothesis generation by supplementing purely inductive and deductive methods.
Quine distinguishes six pragmatic norms: conservatism, modesty, simplicity, gener-
ality, refutability and precision. The first is also called by Quine as the “maxim of
minimum mutilation” (1990/2003, pp. 14–15), and it establishes the following: “The
less rejection of prior beliefs required, the more plausible the hypothesis – other things
being equal” (1970/1978, p. 67). The norm concerning modesty favors hypotheses that
7 Vailati’s modal talk about necessary versus contingent connections between events should not be under-
stood in metaphysical terms. According to his view, the kind of necessity supporting certain kind of condi-
tional expectations is the same as the one supporting sound counter-factual inferences. In this context, the
distinction between necessary and contingent connections between facts is not established on metaphysical
terms, but rather on experiential terms related to the grounding of counter-factual inferences. More precisely,
Vailati argues that only conditional expectations whose condition consists in some deliberate acts support
counterfactuals. In contrast, conditional expectations formed independently of deliberate acts would just
support the belief in contingent connections between facts.
8 Of course, scattered references to pragmatic values like predictive power and simplicity can be found in
works by other authors (this is especially clear in the case of T. S. Kuhn). Among those values, simplicity
has been traditionally emphasized and more carefully characterized, as R. Carnap’s early formulation of the
principle of maximal simplicity suggests. Yet, before Quine, no attempt was pursued to provide a systematic
account of the pragmatic norms governing science.
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are logically weaker and conceptually familiar (cf. ibid., p. 68). The norm of simplic-
ity, which would include Ockham’s razor principle, is stated as follows: “(…) when
choosing a hypothesis subject to subsequent correction, it is the best to choose the
simplest that is not yet excluded” (ibid., p. 72). As for the norm of generality, it says
that our beliefs or hypotheses should be articulated with sufficient generality so that
our initial experimental results will hold in subsequent test situations even though the
latter do not correspond exactly to the first experimental run (cf. ibid., pp. 73–76). The
norm regarding refutability establishes that the greater the cost of retaining previous
beliefs in order to save a hypothesis, the more refutable the hypothesis (ibid., p. 79).
Finally, here is the norm of precision as formulated by Quine: “The more precise a
hypothesis is, the more strongly it is confirmed by each successful prediction that it
generates” (ibid., p. 98).
The Quinean formulation of the pragmatic norms, even if plausible, is clearly lack-
ing in accuracy and exhaustiveness. The reminder of this paper is focused on the
project of developing a formulation of the pragmatic norms more systematic and com-
prehensive than the ones suggested so far. The present account, therefore, includes
several norms that had apparently remained ignored by Quine, perhaps partly due to
the fact that he still restricts his study to theories and hypotheses justification, thereby
joining the traditional neglect of practices. This approach also departs from his in the
assessment of some of the theoretical virtues he mentions. In particular, simplicity
and modesty are here considered as questionable virtues, since, putting computation
aside, there is no clear evidence that simpler, more modest theories are more likely
to be successful than the others. The application of the norm concerning simplicity
is best restricted to computational issues because, as Popper noted decades ago, a
stronger, more informative theory—and therefore one more likely to be false—can
be more interesting than a weaker, less informative theory—that is more likely to be
true. Given the controversy surrounding simplicity, norms concerning the latter are
going to be restricted to the sphere where it is clearly beneficial, namely, the sphere
of computation.
4 Making explicit the pragmatic norms
As already pointed out, the pragmatic norms are here established from a naturalistic
approach that proves especially sensitive to the role of action in scientific research.
Norms are understood, in this context, as principles abstracted from successful prac-
tice. There are some problems posed by the notion of principle, since it seems to involve
explicitness or, at least, some potential explicitness as a characteristic property of the
principles. However, even if potential explicitness is not granted as a necessary con-
dition for norms to be acknowledged, the explicitness of norms, when attainable, may
be extremely helpful in developing a sound scientific methodology. As an effort in that
direction, some pragmatic norms are made explicit this section. In doing that, no men-
tion is made to Popper’s classical distinction between context of discovery and context
of justification—also drawn by Reichenbach, Carnap, and Schlick, among others. The
reason for this absence is that such distinction can be questioned on several different
grounds, becoming clear that the context of discovery constitutes also a context of
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justification. Once that the notion of justification is not restricted to that of examining
the logical connections between statements, the process of devising a new conjecture
and that of examining its justification should not be regarded as necessarily separate
ones. But even if we favoured the logical version of justification, as N. R. Hanson has
convincingly argued, there are relevant logical aspects involved in hypotheses gener-
ation. In fact, the two contexts have been shown to overlap in different ways: on the
one hand, some important features of the context of justification should be studied
empirically, since the logical analysis will not suffice (T. S. Kuhn, W. V. O. Quine),
on the other hand, some relevant aspects of the context of discovery are amenable
to logical study (Hanson, and some recent followers like P. Thagard or A. Aliseda).
Given that no interesting, clear-cut distinction can be drawn between the two contexts,
the norms formulated below are not arranged accordingly.
For the formulation of the norms I have mainly relied on the previous ideas devel-
oped by Peirce, Vailati and Quine, as well as on further support to such ideas provided
by the work of contemporary philosophers of experimentation and methodologists
of science. The norms will be divided into four non-mutually exclusive, partially
independent classes corresponding to four basic goals in science. Norms related to
self-correction and prediction will be regarded as preeminent to those related to expla-
nation, experimentation and computation. As already suggested in dealing with Vai-
lati’s account of conditional expectations, prediction derives this pre-eminence from
its key role as a source of objectivity for both experience and the validity of scientific
conjectures. Following the usual practice in current literature, retro-dictions are here
acknowledged as a kind of prediction, more specifically, as predictions about the past,
which prove essential in sciences like palaeontology, archaeology and cosmology.9
The primacy of self-correction, on the other hand, stems from the fact that the latter
guarantees the possibility of improving any element of the scientific inquiry, and there-
fore the general norms regarding self-correction apply to all the other aspects of the
scientific practice. Furthermore, it must be stressed that prediction and self-correction
turn out to be intertwined in their basic methodological roles. Self-correction involves
to a great extent the resort to predictions, and conversely predictions are also subject
to self-correction. Essential pragmatic norms relative to explanation, experimentation
and computation have to do with requirements concerning prediction and the pos-
sibility of self-correction. In other words, norms meant to improve the three former
aspects of science necessarily imply considerations of predictive and self-correcting
underlying elements, while the converse is not the case. This is not denying that the-
oretical explanations may sometimes play a valuable guiding role in suggesting new
predictions, and even less that predictions themselves can be understood as a form
of explanation. The emphasis, however, is here to be placed on prediction as the key
element involved in the empirical justification of both theories and procedures.
The different classes of norms, therefore, correspond to different essential aspects
of scientific practice connected by a preorder relation of dependence, thus yielding
a partial, weak hierarchy. This means that subordination here holds only between
certain classes of norms and satisfies transitivity, being also possible that subordi-
9 This widely accepted view that has been developed, for example, by P. Lipton in his work from 1991/2004,
p. 169).
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nation between certain subclasses satisfies reflexivity and symmetry. The epistemic
pre-eminence of predictive success is clearly acknowledged in Quine:
“But the ultimate objective is so to choose the revision as to maximize future
success in prediction: future coverage of true observation categoricals. There is
no recipe for this, but maximization of simplicity and minimization of mutila-
tion are maxims by which science strives for vindication in future predictions”
(1990/2003, p. 15).
The priority of predictive success is advocated also in Almeder’s formulation of the
general pragmatic principle concerning the rational justification of scientific beliefs:
“One way to express more succinctly the pragmatic principle (PP) implied by
all this is as follows: Assuming that P is a proposition about the world,
PP. A person is justified in accepting P as true
(a) if P is either soundly inferred directly by inductive or deductive inference
from other known or justified beliefs; or
(b) if when P is not so soundly inferred, there is some real possibility that accept-
ing P as true will tend to be more productive of explanations and precise
predictions than would be the case if one had accepted instead either the
denial of P or nothing at all” (2008, p. 91).
The reference to explanation should not mislead the reader, since Almeder himself
goes on to clarify that good explanations must generate precise predictions of sensory
experiences, thereby pointing to accurate predictions as the final grounds for scientific
belief justification.
Those pragmatists or philosophers of experimentation providing arguments for lay-
ing down the pragmatic norms appear mentioned between brackets. It goes without
saying that the following list is tentative and not intended as exhaustive. In view of
the current controversy surrounding methodological lists for scientific experimental
inquiry,10 it may be appropriate to emphasize the systematic character of the present
one, which derives from the recognition of basic epistemic goals and their respective
dependence relations. One more qualification must be added. Given the instrumental
character of the pragmatic norms, they should be formulated by means of condi-
tional sentences of the form: ‘If goal x is being pursued, then procedure y should be
10 This controversy results from what Hacking calls the “etc. list problem”—that is, the lack of systematic-
ity in the characterization of experimental practice-, and would involve authors like E. Mach, A. Pickering,
D. Gooding, G. Hon, A. Franklin, and R. Harré, among others. Hon argues that recent attempts at formu-
lating epistemological or experimental principles for scientific inquiry have been misguided due to their
extremely ad hoc and eclectic character (cf. 2003, pp. 266–268). She examines the different accounts by
R. Harré, A. Franklin and I. Hacking respectively, to conclude that all of them are too fragmentary, for they
focus either on particular experimental goals or on certain experimental elements without clarifying which
guiding principle should govern the list itself. Her Baconian proposal consists in approaching experiment
from the consideration of possible sources of error (cf. 276–281). According to her, the latter could be of
either of the following classes: script (design), stage (setting), spectator (scientific agent) and moral (inter-
pretation). Despite the perceptiveness and fruitfulness of Hon’s account, the inquiry into the sources of
error is not the only way to secure the systematic character of an intended list of epistemological principles.
Here I provide another way to attain the same end, in this case through the organization of basic epistemic
goals into a partial hierarchy.
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employed’. For the sake of simplicity, the conditional form will not be used in the
formulations, for it seems fairly straightforward to figure out the conditional sentence
corresponding to each norm. Just to avoid any confusion: norms related to self-cor-
rection would be conditionalized to this very goal, those related to prediction would
be conditionalized to the latter, and so on.
I now turn to the formulation of some pragmatic norms that I consider soundly
supported by a careful observation and analysis of scientific practice.
4.1 Norms related to self-correction
Norms related to self-correction are intended to depict those basic requirements that
guarantee the self-corrective character of science. As it is well-known, Peirce pointed
to such character as the key distinctive feature of the scientific method, whose supe-
riority would be owing to its efficacy not only in belief revision but also in method
correction. This reflexive feature of scientific method is emphasized by Peirce in the
following way:
“But with the scientific method the case is different. (…) The test of whether I
am truly following the method is not an immediate appeal to my feelings and
purposes, but, on the contrary, itself involves the application of the method”
(1877b/2006, 123).
The possibility of self-correction, in this context, comes from several experimental
factors of which Peirce was very aware. He draws special attention to repeatability,
manipulability, reliability, error control, independent evidence, and convergence in
results. It is because the scientific method exhibits these features that it has a self-
corrective nature. Put it differently, the application of the scientific method can itself
be tested by applying the method, that is, by repeating, manipulating, controlling the
errors, etc., of the procedure under test. It seems obvious that the above experimental
factors become essential goals of scientific inquiry by virtue of their crucial method-
ological role.
Norms related to self-correction are presented next.
∗ To manipulate the object under study (cf. Vailati and Calderoni 1909/2010,
pp. 250–257; Franklin 2005, Chaps. 13–14). Our knowledge of an object de-
pends on the possibility of finding out that it reacts in systematic ways under
intervention. The open range of possible manipulations guarantees the open range
of possible corrections of our conception of the object.
∗ To devise observational procedures, measurements, experiments that can be repeat-
able (cf. Peirce 1877b/2006, pp. 122–123). The repeatability of those procedures
is essentially required in order to assess their reliability. The latter concerns the
extent to which an experiment, test, or any measuring procedure yields the same
results in repeated trials under the same conditions. In other words, it consists in
the degree to which repeated measurements of the same phenomenon tend to be
consistent with one another.
123
Synthese (2013) 190:3227–3246 3241
∗ To subject the experimental apparatus to calibration and to reproduce artifacts
(Franklin 2005, Chaps. 13–14). This norm amounts to the requirement of self-
correction applied to instruments.
∗ To avoid noise and confounds (Messick 1989, pp. 28–33). In order to find out
which of the various parameters affect a given effect, and which of them are
essentially required to prompt such effect, it is required to systematically change
experimental parameters.
∗ To devise careful simulations of errors that “make them talk” (Mayo 1996, p.
36). This would make possible, in turn, to devise a severe tests for a hypothesis,
and ultimately to come up with experimental tests which make possible a rational
choice between alternative hypotheses. Some recent literature on “deficit stud-
ies” provides also some interesting insights into how the deliberate creation of
structural failures in a system may help to further explore such system (cf. Craver
2002, pp. S12–S13, Bechtel 2002, pp. S51–S53).
∗ To avoid possible bias prompted by the use of a single procedure by performing
multiple measures of each theoretical construct under scrutiny (Peirce 1878/2006,
pp. 142, 146–147; Messick 1989, p. 65). This norm is meant to foster convergence
of results, since convergent evidence shows that the measurements inter-correlate
as implied by the theory.
4.2 Norms related to prediction
Pragmatic norms concerning prediction would help to ground existence assertions on
well supported conditional expectations, to put it in Vailati’s terms. Some of the main
goals to foster in relation to prediction are precision, explorative efficacy, testing effi-
cacy, all of them related to the robustness of predictions. The following two norms
related to prediction must be taken into account.
∗ To favor laboratory controlled predictions over field predictions, since only the first
provide enough grounds to ascertain a non-contingent relation between events (Pei-
rce 1902–1907/2006, p. 162). Again, this has to do with the role that manipulation
must play in predictions in order for them to convey valuable information about
objects and events.
∗ To increase the number of significant predictions, not only to test a particular the-
ory or to support causal explanations, but also to determine empirical regularities
(Steinle 1997, pp. s65–s66). Steinle convincingly argues that there are different
ways to engage in experimental practice, being theory testing just one of them.
In particular, he distinguishes between what he calls “standard experimentation”
(focused on theory testing) and “exploratory experimentation” (focused on formu-
lating regularities). The central experimental procedure characteristic of the latter
would be the systematic variation of experimental parameters, in order to find
out which of the various parameters affect a given effect, and which of them are
essentially required to prompt such effect. According to him, exploratory experi-
mentation is especially useful in concept-formation, since the attempt to determine
regularities would often require the application of new categories. An example of
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observance of this norm is the predictions of the positions of the heavenly bodies
during the Babylonian period.
4.3 Norms related to explanation
Tuning now to the norms related to explanation, the following associated goals should
be mentioned: predictive efficacy, empirical adequacy, coherence, scope. Let us see
how these goals shape the corresponding norms.
∗ To give (when possible) causal explanations that either prove predictively efficient
or account for unpredictable phenomena. This norm is based on some ideas that
Suppes presents is his 1985 paper “Explaining the Unpredictable”, where he states:
“For many phenomena in many domains there are principled reasons to believe
that we shall never be able to move from good explanations to good predictions”
(Suppes 1985, p. 194). As examples of those cases he refers to explanations of past
events, random events (like quantum phenomena), or chaotic, instable events (like
roulette wheel outcomes or human behavior). The key point in this norm is the
emphasis on the predictive power of explanations, which is only restricted either
by research limitations or by the very nature of events. Despite these restrictions,
explanation remains more connected to prediction than it might seem at first, since,
as pointed out by Suppes, successful explanations of unpredictable events usually
consist in a specification of those parameters and causal relations that would have
enabled predictions if they could have been specified in advance.
∗ To use (when possible) causal explanations that do not appeal to unverified causes,
neither supernatural or religious nor metaphysical (Bertrand Russell’s version of
Ockham’s razor). The creationism versus Darwinism debate exemplifies a clear
opposition regarding this issue, for the creationist obviously appeals to an unver-
ified, religious cause in order to explain how the homo sapiens appeared on the
earth, while Darwinism resorts to verified causes. Aristotle’s explanation of the
stillness of the earth in terms of natural movement constitutes a clear example of
non-observance of this norm (De Caelo, Book II, Ch. 13)).
∗ To devise hypothesis that cohere with previously existing successful hypotheses
(Quine’s conservatism). Seen from a different angle, this norm establishes that
hypotheses should be devised in such a way that they were approximated by pre-
vious ones.
∗ To explain the same kind of phenomenon in terms of the same cause (Vailati 1907,
p. 708). In a strict sense no facts repeat themselves, which implies that to assert
that there is a causal relation amounts to saying “that effects which resemble one
another constantly succeed causes which resemble one another” (ibid., italics in
the original). This norm closely connects with Newton’s second rule for scientific
reasoning:
“Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the
same causes” (1687/1848, Book III, p. 384).11
11 Book III begins with Newton’s formulation of four “rules of reasoning in natural philosophy”. Let us
recall the remaining three:
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Incidentally, there is a common preconception about causal relationships that, as
opposed to the former, is not empirically supported, namely, that the effect must be
similar to the cause.
∗ To favor one theory over another when, ceteris paribus, the first is applicable in
some new domain (Quine’s generality norm).
4.4 Norms related to experiments and computation
Because of the partially overlapping nature of the present classification, there are
some norms which do not appear here only to avoid redundancy (in particular, those
regarding the threats of noise, confounds and bias). The main sub-goals involved in
experiment and computation are: the test of empirical adequacy, scope and simplicity.
The following four norms seem especially important.
∗ To avoid the empirical under-representation of theoretical concepts, that is, to set
the relevant variables subject to determination in an experiment in such a way
that reflects the breadth of the theoretical construct invoked in the interpretation
of the experiment (Messick 1989, pp. 34–35). The evaluation of construct validity
involves close examination of the auxiliary theory or theories specifying the rela-
tionship between concepts and empirical indicators. The purpose of this norm is
clearly to increase the empirical robustness of theoretical constructs by increasing
the number and soundness of their empirical indicators.
∗ To gather discriminant evidence that the measurement or experiment is not related
to some other theoretical concept accounting for the results obtained (Messick
Footnote 11 continued
Rule I: “We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain
their appearances”.
Rule III: “The qualities of bodies, which admit neither intensification nor remission of degrees, and which
are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal
qualities of bodies whatsoever” (added in the 1713 edition, ibid., pp. 384–385).
Rule IV: “In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions inferred by general induction from
phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imag-
ined, till such time as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more accurate, or liable
to exceptions” (added in the 1726 edition, ibid., p. 385).
In discussing Newton’s rules, Barry Gower points out the following: “Newton used the first and second
rules, usually together, to justify the claim that the ‘same sort of cause’, namely a gravitational force, must be
responsible for the behaviour of heavy terrestrial objects, for the Moon’s orbiting the Earth, for the planets’
orbiting the Sun, and for the satellites of Saturn and Jupiter orbiting their planets” (Gower 1997, p. 71).
Interestingly, shortly after the above remark, Gower notes that Newton hardly provided any justification for
the rules, which are instead vindicated by the scientific results that they make possible to achieve. It may be
worthwhile to compare Newton’s second Rule with Hume’s fourth rule for judging causes and effects: “The
same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same cause. This
principle we derive from experience, and is the source of most of our philosophical reasonings. For when by
any clear experiment we have discovered the causes or effects of any phenomenon, we immediately extend
our observation to every phenomenon of the same kind, without waiting for that constant repetition, from
which the first idea of this relation is derived” (1739–1740/1964, Book I, Part III, Sect. XV, pp. 170–171).
In neither case the rules of causation are grounded on metaphysical commitments regarding necessities in
nature. In Newton’s case, the justification seems rather pragmatic, and, in the case of Hume, it comes from
the psychological laws of association formulated by him.
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1989, pp. 34–36). Put another way, the idea is to avoid that variance in test proves
irrelevant to theoretical constructs, for in that case the constructs would include
something that should be left out.
∗ To favor between two new experiments, ceteris paribus, the one that has more
variation between the two (pragmatic principle of the variability or generality of
experiments). The robustness of experiments significantly depends on the degree
of satisfaction of this norm.
∗ To favour theories which are computationally simpler or more efficient, other things
being equal (Quine’s simplicity principle restricted to computation). An example
of this is Ptolemy’s choice of the eccentric circle system over the epicycle system
after having proven their equivalence.
5 Closing remarks
Finally, to further clarify the above issues, I would like mention some common cases
of non-observance of the pragmatic norms. According to such norms, obvious cases
of flawed scientific practice are those in which traditional or metaphysical assump-
tions are kept despite their lack of empirical value (i.e., their being non-testable and
not helpful in predictions), causal explanations of predictable phenomena are given
despite their predictive inefficiency, generalizations are made even if they are empiri-
cally unsupported, empirical claims are discussed the same way as speculative claims
(i.e., by equally examining every logical possible justification of the claim) regardless
of well ascertained probabilities about empirical events that would help to rule out
some of the possible justifications, and also those cases in which accommodations,
instead of predictions, are employed to test a theory. The first case can be illustrated
with the notion of vital principle used in biology and physiology from ancient times
to the beginning of the XX century, despite its metaphysical, non-testable character.
The second case may be exemplified with Aristotle’s postulation of natural places
to explain mechanical phenomena, a causal postulate which involves a predictively
inefficient explanation of predictable phenomena. On the other hand, XIX century
physiology is riddled with empirically unsupported generalizations about racial fea-
tures, which illustrates the third case of pragmatically flawed inquiry. The marked
speculative nature of Aristotle’s main argument for the spherical shape of the earth
constitutes an example for the next kind of case (let us recall that the argument devel-
oped deductively from the assumption that the earth and the universe have the same
center). Finally, a famous case in which accommodations are employed, instead of
predictions, is that of psychoanalysis, severely criticized by Popper.
The present formulation of the pragmatic norms is meant to capture those implicit
principles which, by supplementing the traditional principles regarding deductive or
inductive inferences, successfully govern scientific practice. The ultimate basis for
a vindication of the pragmatic norms has to do with a connection emphasized by
classical pragmatists between objectivity and experimentally controlled prediction.
Such connection determines a partial hierarchy between different types of pragmatic
norms, which implies that successful explanations, for instance, must satisfy stronger
predictive requirements than it is usually acknowledged (i.e., requirements beyond
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conservatism). The justification of the pragmatic norms comes from a non-reductivist
naturalistic approach according to which such norms, even if recognized just from
actual instrumental success in practice, are nevertheless grounded on essential char-
acteristics of cognition, like the basic relation between repeatable manipulation and
expectation.
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